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This paper uses time-series model to estimate the effects of privatisation and FDI on 
economic  growth  in  Argentina  over  the  period  1971-  2000.  Unit  root  tests  and  Co-
integration tests are used to ensure that all variables used are stationary and that there 
exists  a  long  run  relationship  among  the  variables.  An  error  correction  model  is 
constructed to estimate both the short- and long-run effects of privatisation and FDI on 
economic growth in Argentina. The evidence suggest that during 1971- 2000, FDI had no 
effect on either short- or long-run economic growth in Argentina, while privatisation had 
negative significant effects on economic growth in the long-run only,  
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While the economic literature includes many individual empirical studies on FDI and 
economic growth (e.g. Urbiztondo, 1998; Elshee and Pagen, 1999, De Mello, 1997 and 
1999), and other studies on Argentina’s privatisation, in particular (e.g. Alexander and 
Corti, 1993; Clarke and Cull, 1998a, 1998b, and 1999; Gerchunoff and Coloma, 1993), 
very  few  were  done  on  the  effects  of  privatisation  on  economic  growth,  in  general. 
Rather, empirical research focused on the effects of privatisation on employment (e.g. 
Bhaskar and Khan, 1995; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1998; Kikeri, 1998), its fiscal impact on 
government budget (e.g. Hemming and Mansoor, 1988; Mansoor, 1988; Pinheiro and 
Schneider,  1995),  or  its  effects  on  total  and  private  investment  (e.g.  Abdou  and 
Moshiri, 2009).  
 
The contribution of this paper is that it aims at addressing the gap in the literature in 
terms of assessing the  direct effects of privatisation on economic  growth. This paper 
focuses  on  exploring  the  separate  effects  of  both  privatisation  and  FDI  on  economic 
growth in Argentina. The paper uses error correction model to investigate the effects of 
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2. Background and Historical Trends: 
 
The Argentine economy, similar to other developing economies, was characterised by 
large  dominant  inefficient  state-owned  enterprises.  It  faced  even  more  severe 
macroeconomic problems (such as hyperinflation, high external debts, and low growth 
rates). By 1989, with inflation reaching to 5000% p.a. and GDP decreasing for three 
consecutive years (Gerchunoff and Coloma, 1993; Shaikh et al., 1996), the Argentine 
government headed by President Carlos Menem realised that privatisation, as a part of a 
comprehensive  economic  reform  programme,  is  required  to  address  those  sever 
macroeconomic problems. 
 
The Argentine privatisation programme officially started in 1989 with 260 companies in 
the  non-financial  sector-  most  of  which  were  in  the  infrastructure  sector-  and  37 
companies in the financial sector, with 310,000 workers. The government of Argentina 
started with privatising its largest and most difficult SOEs (e.g. ENTel and the airline 
company), most of which were concentrated in the infrastructure sector. The programme 
was applied in a very fast pace; which led to the privatisation of two-third of the enlisted 
public enterprises within the first five years
1. The main privatisation methods applied 
were  the  sale  of shares  in the  new  companies  (e.g.  the  telecommunication  company- 
ENtel) or via providing concession rights (e.g. highways, and railroads) for up to 99 years 
to operate these new companies (The World Bank, 1993, p. 5). The sale of shares was 
usually  partial;  at  least  51%  was  sold  to  private  companies,  39%  was  kept  by  the 
government  for  later  sale via  public  offering in  the  stock  market  once  the privatised   5
company  operates  successfully,  and  10%  to  the  employees.
2  In  some  cases,  the 
government opted for selling more than 51% of the shares to private companies, such as 
in the privatisation of ENTel where 60% of the shares were sold directly to a major 
investor, 10% to the employees, and the 30% maintained by the government were later 
offered in the stock market once the operations of the newly privatised company proves 
successful and the stock market had become more developed (Gerchunoff and Coloma, 
1993, p. 259 and p. 297). By 2000, total proceeds of the Argentine programme were $ 
44.581 billion, and it is considered one of the largest privatisation programmes in the 
region (World Bank, various issues).  
 
The Argentine government encouraged the participation of FDI in the programme, and in 
some cases, it specifically required that at least one of the buyers to be a multinational 
corporation  (e.g.  the  privatisation  of  the  national  airline  company).  The  Argentine 
government, therefore, totally liberalised FDI regulations since the 1990s, which led to an 
unprecedented rise in FDI inflows to Argentina that continued even after the privatisation 
of SOEs were almost finished (Urbiztondo, 1998). FDI participation in the Argentine 




Prior to 1990, the size of FDI inflows to Argentina was relatively insignificant. During 
1946 – 1989, the participation of FDI in the economy was limited.  In the petroleum 
sector, for example, though it was dominated by the national company YPF, two foreign 
companies – Shell and Exxon- equally shared between them 1/3 of the country’s refining   6
and  distillation  capacity  (Gerchunoff  and  Coloma,  1993,  p.  283).  In  the  1990s, 
Argentina’s  economic  policies  became  more  outward  oriented  and  FDI  policies  were 
liberalised (WIR, 1992). The application of privatisation- combined with other policies 
(e.g. Convertibility Act, and the deregulation of FDI policies) - offered new investment 
opportunities and significantly contributed to the impressive increase in FDI inflows to 
Argentina during the 1990s (Urbiztondo, 1998, WIR, 1993, and WIR, 2000). 
 
Figure 1: Share of FDI in GDP (1970-2000) in Argentina 












Source: Calculated from the WDI (2002) 
 
 
Economic growth trends in Argentina, on the other hand, have been relatively volatile 
and mostly negative up until 1991 (figure 2). During 1960 – 2000, Argentina’s GDP per 
capita  growth  rates had been  negative  in  16  different  years
4.  Using  Dobronogov  and 
Iqbal’s (2005) approach of analysing economic development, a 5-year moving average of   7
GDP per capita growth is created for Argentina (figure 2). One can distinguish between 
four economic phases that were influenced by the political regime prevailing at the time: 
 
1-  The domination of populist policies under the Peronist rule (1960- 1975). 
2-  Policies  of  stimulating  private  investment  and  agricultural  exports  during  the 
Military rule (1976- 1983). 
3-  Attempts  to  revive  the  industrial  sector  during  the  Radical  Party  rule  (1983- 
1989). 
4-  Economic  Reform  and  Privatisation  during  the  rule  of  the  Justicialist  Party 
(1989- 2000). 
Figure 2: Economic Growth in Argentina during 1961-2000 













Source: Calculated from WDI (2002) 
The above figure indicates that during the privatisation era of 1989 – 2000, Argentina 
witnessed  a  temporary  increase  in  economic  growth.  This  paper  examines  whether 
privatisation and FDI had any significant effects on economic growth in Argentina. The   8
paper develops as following: section 3 presents a brief literature review of economic 
growth  theories  and  models,  and  review  of  empirical  studies  on  the  effects  of 
privatisation  and  FDI  on  economic  growth.  Section  4  presents  the  methodology  and 
theoretical specification of the model. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 
6 presents some concluding remarks.  
 
3. Literature Review: 
 
The literature presents two main growth theories on which most growth empirics are 
based: the neo-classical growth and endogenous growth. The neo-classical growth, which 
was  pioneered  by  Solow  (1956)  and  Swan  (1956),  stipulates  that  long  run  economic 
growth  is  solely  achieved  by  exogenous  changes  in  technology,  savings  and  labour. 
Changes in capital stock will affect short-run economic growth. In this sense, the neo-
classical approach regards FDI as addition to the physical capital stock in the economy, 
and  hence  it  will  affect  economic  growth  in  the  short-run  only.  However,  the  neo-
classical growth theory does point to the possibility of endogenous effects among the 
three variables of technical progress, capital and labour as “the rate of technical progress 
may not be independent of the rate of accumulation, or … accumulation may give rise to 
external economies … [and] the rate of growth of labour may not be independent of the 
rate  of  accumulation”  (Swan,  1956,  pp.  338-9).  Hence,  one  may  argue  that  in  an 
augmented  neo-classical  model,  the  accumulation  of  FDI  may  give  rise  to  external 
economies in the form of technological spillovers that are by-products of FDI, and hence 
FDI  can  affect  long-run  economic  growth.  In  addition,  FDI  helps  in  closing  the  gap   9
between  domestic  investment  and  domestic  savings.  In  other  words,  the  effect  of  an 
increase in FDI is similar to the effect of an increase in savings as FDI is simply foreign 
savings transferred to the host economy.  The effects of privatisation on economic growth 
can also be explained within the neo-classical context. While the Keynesian model calls 
for  government  intervention,  the  neo-classical  model  calls  for  the  reduction  of 
government  intervention,  stipulating  that  equilibrium  and  economic  growth  can  be 
achieved via free market practices. The broad definition of privatisation is “the act of 
reducing the role of the government, or increasing the role of the private sector in an 
activity or in the ownership of assets” (Savas, 1987, p.3). In this sense, if privatisation 
leads to less government intervention and the application of more free market practices, 
then this may lead to economic growth according to the neo-classical school. 
 
The  endogenous  growth  theory, on the  other  hand,  stipulates  that  long-run economic 
growth  can  be  achieved  by  endogenous  factors  within  the  system.  By  differentiating 
between physical and human capital [i.e. Y = A f (K, L, HK)], Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988) argued that the accumulation of human capital in the form of knowledge, know 
how and innovation, will endogenously induce technological progress and hence achieve 
sustained  economic  growth.  In  this  sense,  (exogenous)  factors  such  as  FDI  and 
privatisation will have endogenous effects on other factors of production (e.g. human 
capital  and  technological  level),  which  will  lead  to  long-run  (endogenous)  economic 
growth. FDI is usually accompanied by transfer of technology, know how, and training of 
labour;  all  of  which  contribute  to  the  accumulation  of  human  capital  and  induce 
technological progress in the host country that will lead to long-run economic growth.
5   10
Similarly, the effects of privatisation on long run economic growth can be explained via 
its effects on the level of innovation in the economy. Private sector is believed to be more 
innovative  than  public  sector  because  the  former  is  driven  by  profit  maximisation 
objectives and therefore is in constant search of new economically profitable production 
techniques (Gylfason et al., 1998). In that sense, privatisation, which in effect means the 
reduction of the size of the public sector and the expansion of the private sector will be 
accompanied  by  increase  in  the  level  of  innovation  and  hence  will  induce  long-run 
economic growth. In addition, privatisation can affect other production factors within the 
system  such  as  (domestic  and  foreign)  investment.  By  attracting  more  foreign 
investment
6, privatisation is indirectly inducing the positive spillovers of investment (i.e. 
technology transfer, labour training, and innovation) which will have endogenous effects 
on long run economic growth.  
 
Using a modified neo-classical production function, several empirical studies attempted 
to  investigate  the  effects  of  FDI  on  economic  growth  within  the  framework  of  the 
endogenous growth theory. The literature includes several studies on the effects of FDI 
on economic growth. Empirical studies found that FDI could affect economic growth via 
four main channels. FDI can affect economic growth via affecting domestic physical 
capital through crowding in effects (e.g. De Mello, 1999; Fry, 1996; Marwah and Klein, 
1998)  and  creating  linkages  with  domestic  investment  (e.g.  Borensztein  et  al.,  1998; 
Markusen and Venables, 1997 and 1999).  
   11
The  second  channel  through  which  FDI  can  affect  economic  growth  is  through 
technology transfer. Balsaubramanyam et al. (1996 and 1999) - using cross-section data 
for a sample of 46 developing countries from 1970 to 1985 - and Kohpainboon (2006) – 
using cross-industry data for the manufacturing sector in Thailand, found that FDI leads 
to  technological  progress  due  to  technology  transfer,  which  will  lead  to  increasing 
economic  growth.  It  was  also  found  that  this  effect  on  technology  levels  and  hence 
economic growth is augmented in countries that follow export-promotion policies and 
have a minimum threshold of human capital (Balsaubramanyam et al., 1999). 
 
FDI can also affect economic growth via affecting human capital in the host country. 
The main conclusion of empirical studies that were carried out on the effects of FDI on 
economic growth through its effects on human capital (e.g. Borensztein  et al., 1996; De 
Mello, 1999; and Balasubramanyam et al., 1999) was that FDI requires a minimum level 
of human capital in order to have positive spillovers on growth. In addition, FDI does not 
create human  capital  per  se;  rather  it  augments this threshold  level  of human  capital 
through the transfer of knowledge.
7 Hanson (1996) provided supporting evidence to the 
above  by  proving  that  the  lack  of  human  capital,  in  the  sense  of  the  lack  of  formal 
education and training, in addition to political risk, are accounted for the little flows of 
FDI to developing countries. 
 
The fourth channel through which FDI can affect economic growth is trade. One of the 
prominent examples of how FDI affects economic growth by affecting trade is China. 
Zhang (2001) argued that FDI affected China’s growth by expanding its manufacturing   12
exports,  creating  linkages  with  the  domestic  firms,  and  augmenting  human  capital 
through the diffusion of technology.
8 Goldberg and Klein (1997) also found that FDI in 
Latin America and Asia affected their trade flows with the industrialised countries (i.e. 
the source of FDI), and hence their economic growth. 
 
Empirical literature on the effects of FDI on economic growth has also suggested the 
existence of an endogenous relationship (i.e. a bi-directional relationship) between FDI 
and economic growth. Li and Liu (2005) used panel data for 84 countries over the period 
of  1970-1999  and  applying  both  single  and  simultaneous  equations  models.  They 
identified a significant endogenous relationship between FDI and economic growth since 
the mid 1980s onwards. They have also found supporting evidence that FDI can promote 
economic  growth  directly  and  indirectly  via  affecting  human  capital  and  technology 
transfer to the host country. 
 
While there  has  been  a lot of  empirical  research  on  the effects  of  FDI  on economic 
growth,  there  has not  been  a  lot  of  research  on  the  direct  effects  of  privatisation  on 
economic growth. Rather, as mentioned earlier, empirical research focused on the effects 
of  privatisation  on  employment,  government  budget,  or  investment.  One  seminal 
empirical study, however, explicitly addressed the effects of privatisation on economic 
growth. Plane (1997) used a sample of 35 developing countries over the period 1988 – 
1992 and applied Probit and Tobit models to investigate the effects of privatisation on 
economic  growth.  Plane  (1997)  found  a  significant positive  effect  of  privatisation  on 
economic growth in these countries. He found  that, on average, privatisation boosted   13
economic growth in the sampled countries “by about 0.8 to 1.5 percentage points between 
the two sub-periods (1988-92/ 1984 -88)” (Plane, 1997, p. 360). 
 
Recently, empirical research (e.g. Cook and Uchida, 2001; Bennett et al., 2004; Filipovic, 
2005;  and  Staehr,  2005)  started  to  address  the  relationship  between  privatisation  and 
economic growth. Bennett et al. (2004) investigated the effects of privatisation methods 
on economic growth during 1990 – 2001 in a sample of 23 transition economies. They 
used a Cobb-Douglas production function and added to it four privatisation variables; a 
variable to measure the share of private sector in GDP as a proxy for total privatisation 
and 3 dummy variables for each privatisation method (i.e. full, mixed and mass). They 
estimated their model using both OLS and GMM techniques. Their evidence suggests 
that  economic  growth  in  the  sampled  countries  is  significantly  affected  by  Mass 
privatisation in particular, where a 1% point increase in Mass privatisation leads to 24% 
point increase in economic  growth.
9 They interpret this effect that Mass privatisation 
leads to the development of capital markets, which are in turn positively correlated with 
economic growth.  
 
Staehr (2005) used a balanced panel of 25 transition economies over the period of 1989 – 
2001 to investigate the effects of reforms in general (including privatisation) on economic 
growth  in  these  countries.  Staehr  (2005)  found  that  while  small-scale  privatisation 
without adjoining structural reforms may have positive effects on economic growth in the 
medium  term,  large-scale  privatisation  without  adjoining  reforms  would  in  fact  have 
negative effects on economic growth.    14
 
The above empirical studies imply that FDI and privatisation, individually, may have 
positive  effects  on  the  economic  growth  in  the  developing  countries.  This  paper 
contributes to the literature by investigating the effects of both FDI and privatisation on 
economic growth using the case of Argentina. 
 
4. Methodology and the Model: 
 
It is argued that countries with low levels of physical and human capital will follow the 
neo-classical  model  in  the  sense  that,  at  the  beginning,  growth  will  be  affected  by 
physical capital only, and hence FDI will be regarded as an accumulation to the physical 
capital and affects short run economic growth. However, in order to sustain this growth, 
physical capital needs to be accumulated, and by investing in education, the augmentation 
of human capital follows (Graca et. al, 1994, p. 3).
10 The transition from neo-classical 
growth to sustained growth will eventually depend on the saving behaviour prevailing in 
the economy. This implies that the effects of FDI in countries with low levels of human 
capital will follow the neo-classical growth model while in countries with high levels of 
human capital they will follow the endogenous growth model. One of the indicators that 
are used to measure human capital in several empirical studies (e.g. Barro, 1991 and 
2000; Borensztein et al., 1998; Li and Liu, 2005) is secondary school average attainment 
of the population above 25 years old. Borensztein et al. (1998) found that, within an 
endogenous growth framework, FDI would have positive effects on economic growth in   15
countries with a minimum initial threshold of secondary school attainment of 0.52 (as 
calculated from Barro-Lee (1993) education data set). 
 
In  1975,  the  average  secondary  school  attainment  ratio  was  0.472  in  Argentina.
11  In 
addition, the time period covered by this study is relatively short. Data on FDI inflows is 
available  from  1970,  and  privatisation  has  only  been  applied  in  1989  in  Argentina. 
Hence, a neo-classical growth model seems more appropriate to explain the effects of 
FDI and privatisation on economic growth in Argentina during 1971-2000. 
 
Empirical  literature  includes  two  methodologies  of  modelling  economic  growth  (De 
Mello, 1997, pp. 10-4). The first is known as “growth accounting”, where variables such 
as FDI and privatisation are considered as additional inputs in an augmented neo-classical 
production  function
12.  Empirical  research  indicates  that  economic  growth  is  also 
determined by other factors such as the level of openness (Edwards, 1998; Vamvakidis, 
2002)  or  degree  of  export  orientation  (Balasubramanayam  et  al.,  1996  and  1999), 
privatisation (Plane, 1997; Cook and Uchida, 2001; Bennett et al., 2004; Staehr, 2005), 
and  external  (foreign)  debt  (Lin  and  Sosin,  2001;  Pattillo  et  al.,  2002).  Hence,  an 
augmented neo-classical production function will look as follows:  
 
 Y = Af (K, L, HK, F, X, Priv, D)                                                                                (1) 
 
where Y is output measured by GDP, A is a constant that captures the technological 
progress, K is domestic capital stock, L is labour, HK is human capital, F is FDI stock, X   16
is  exports,  Priv  is  privatisation,  and  D  is  external  debt.  In  other  words,  the  Growth 
accounting methodology reflects the supply-side of the economy. 
    
The second methodology is using an intertemporal utility maximisation framework of 
private consumption, which models the demand side of the economy
13. 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the effects of FDI and privatisation on economic 
growth as measured by growth in output per capita (i.e. GDP per capita). Hence, the 
growth  accounting  methodology  is  followed.  Furthermore,  growth  accounting  is 
conventionally used by empirical studies that follow the neoclassical growth model (De 
Mello, 1997, p. 10).  
 
Data  on  active  employed  labour  force  is  not  readily  available  (Ramirez,  2006). 
Alternative variables such as total labour force or population of working age may be 
used. However, the unit root tests on these two alternative variables indicate that, for the 
case of Argentina, they may be I(2) or higher, as will be reported in the following section. 
Many empirical studies (e.g. Li and Liu, 2005; Vamvakidis, 2002; Pattillo et al., 2002) 
use population to proxy for labour. Hence, the above production function becomes:  
 
Yt = A f (Kt, Popt, FDIt, HKt, Xt, Privt, Dt)                                                                         (2) 
 
In addition, long time series data on FDI stock is not available; rather data on FDI inflows 
is more recorded. However, Kinniburgh and Ribeiro (1986) suggest that stock data can be   17
derived by simply accumulating annual flow data. The same concept can also apply on 
deriving data on domestic capital stock.   
 
The  above  model  is  similar  to  that  used  by  Ramirez  (2006)  except  that  it  adds 
privatisation and external debt ratio to the explanatory variables. Economic growth is 
measured  by  growth  in  GDP  per  capita.  Hence,  weighing  the  above  function  with 
population and taking logs to ensure the linearity of the above function, growth in GDP 
per capita is represented by:  
 
￿gdppct = α + β ￿kpct + γ ￿fdipct + δ ￿hkt + η ￿xppct + λ ￿privpct + µ ￿xdebtratt + εt           (3)    
 
where lower-case letters denote the natural logs of the relevant variables.  
All variables are per capita, except for xdebtratio which is external debt ratio to GDP. 
Growth rates are calculated by first difference (i.e. ￿yt = yt – yt-1)
14. 
The  parameters  α,β,γ,  ..etc  represent  the  elasticity  of  growth  in GDP  per  capita  with 
respect to each explanatory variable. The model is estimated over period 1971 – 2000, 
which includes the privatisation era in most of the developing countries that was during 
late 1980s to 2000.  By 2000, privatisation in most of the developing countries were 
finished or reached to a halt. Data for privatisation proceeds are collected from the IFC 
privatisation database and calculated in constant 1995 US$. Privatisation in Argentina 
officially started in 1989, but the IFC privatisation database record a transaction in 1988. 
The observations for 1971 – 1987 are, hence, given zero values. Data on human capital is 
obtained from  WDI  (2002). Annual data are available for 1990 – 2000. Data for the 
remaining time period (i.e. 1971-1989) is available in 5 years intervals.  Since human   18
capital  is  considered  as  a  relatively  time-invariant  variable  (Islam,  1995),  one  may 
assume a constant growth rate in the enrolment ratio over each 5 years interval. Hence, 
the  missing  values  for  human  capital  can  be  linearly  estimated.  Data  for  all  other 
variables are collected from the WDI (2002) and are calculated in constant 1995 US$. 
Constant values are calculated by dividing current values over the GDP deflator.
15 
 
Given that time series for macro economic variables such as GDP usually exhibit time 
trends (i.e. their mean and variance depend on time and the covariance is not constant) 
(Maddala, 2001; Harris and Sollis, 2003). In such cases, the series is non-stationary or 
I(1) (i.e. any sudden shock will not fade over time). Including a non-stationary variable in 
the model will result in spurious regression.
16 Hence, before estimating the model, we 
need to test for unit root (i.e. test whether a series is non-stationary [I(1)], or stationary 
[I(0)]).  
 
To test for unit root, we apply the Dicky-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) 
tests on each variable. The DF test estimates the following model: 
 
∆yt = γ + δt + αyt-1 + εt                                                                                                     (4) 
 
While the ADF test estimates the following model: 







j   λ  + et                                                                            (5) 
The null hypothesis of the DF and ADF tests is α = 1 (i.e. unit root) and hence yt is non-
stationary (i.e. I(1)), while the alternative hypothesis is α < 1 (i.e. no unit root) and hence   19
yt is stationary (i.e. I(0)). One of the limitations of the DF and ADF tests is their weak 
power  especially  in  small  samples.  Furthermore,  rejecting  or  accepting  the  null 
hypothesis will also depend on the number of lags used. Using too many lags will lead to 
over  acceptance  of  the  null  hypothesis,  while  using  too  few  lags  may  lead  to  over 
rejection. In addition, the inclusion of deterministic trends affects the results of the DF 
and ADF tests
17. A sequence of steps is suggested by Perron’s (1988) and reported in 
Harris  and  Sollis  (2003)  whereby  a  general  specification  of  DF  test  is  applied  that 
includes both intercept (γ) and time trend (t). If the null hypothesis of a unit root is not 
rejected  under  the  general  specification  of  the  test,  “testing  continues  down  to  more 
restricted  specifications”
18  (i.e.  specification  with  intercept  but  no  time  trend,  then 
specification with no intercept or time trend). Testing stops as soon as the null hypothesis 
of unit root is rejected.
19 
 
Once unit root tests establish that all variables are non-stationary at levels, to ensure 
obtaining  non-spurious  regression  results,  it  is  necessary  to  determine  whether  the 
variables are cointegrated and there exist a long run relationship among them. This can be 
done  by  applying  Johansen’s test for  cointegration  (Maddala,  2001).  The aim  of  this 
research  is  to  investigate  the  effects  of  FDI  and  privatisation  on  economic  growth. 
Therefore, the cointegration tests are applied on gdppc, kpc, hk,  fdipc, and privpc. Once a 
cointergration relationship is estimated, an error correction model will be estimated to 
capture both short- and long-run effects on economic growth. 
 
   20
5. Empirical results: 
 
5.1 Unit Root tests: 
 
Data for all variables (except privatisation) are collected from the World Development 
Indicators (2002), while privatisation data is obtained from the IFC. Table 1 reports the 
results of the DF and ADF tests with intercept and no time trend (τγ), and with intercept 
and time trend (τδ)  for the above variables using 4 lags and applying both the Schwarz 
Bayesian (SB) and Akaike Information (AI) criteria. 
 
Unit  root  tests  on  Working  Population  variable  (LWpop)  and  its  first  difference 
(DLWpop) could not reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity; indicating that this 
variable could be of I(2) or higher integration order. The same result was obtained when 
the unit root tests were performed on Total Labour Force (LL) variable. Using any of 
these  two  variables  in  the  regression  would  have  produced  spurious  results.  Hence, 
following the example of previous empirical studies, as indicated earlier, Population was 
used to proxy for Labour. The results of the restricted version of the ADF (τγ) contradict 
those for the unrestricted version (τδ) for for LPOP (table 1). However, following the 
suggested  sequence  of  steps  by  Perron  (1989),  we  accept  the  results  of  the  general 
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Table 1: Unit Root tests for Argentina’s model 
Variablea  τγ  τδ  I 







































-0.66      (0) 
-4.83**    (0) 
 
-1.07      (1) 
-3.07**    (0) 
 
 2.24      (1) 
-1.06      (0) 
 
 1.25      (1) 
-1.45      (0) 
 
-5.73**    (4) 
-0.67      (1) 
 
-2.27      (0) 
-3.37**    (0) 
 
-2.28      (0) 
-3.38**    (0) 
 
-1.14      (4) 
-3.01**    (3) 
 
 0.10      (0) 
-5.07**    (1) 
 
-0.25      (1) 
-9.50**    (0) 
 
-0.93      (2) 
-2.05      (1) 
 
-0.56      (1) 
-11.18**  (0) 
 
-2.96*     (0) 
-5.49**    (0) 
-0.66      (0) 
-4.83**    (0) 
 
-1.07      (1) 
-3.07**    (0) 
 
 2.24      (1) 
-1.06      (0) 
 
 1.25      (1) 
-1.45      (0) 
 
-5.73**    (4) 
-0.67      (1) 
 
-1.96      (1) 
-3.37**    (0) 
 
-1.98      (1) 
-3.38**    (0) 
 
-1.14      (4) 
-3.01**    (3) 
 
 0.42      (2) 
-5.07**    (1) 
 
-0.25      (1) 
-9.50**    (0) 
 
-0.93      (2) 
-2.68      (3) 
 
-0.56      (1) 
-5.79**    (1) 
 
-2.96*     (0) 
-5.49**    (0) 
-1.79      (0) 
-4.75**    (0) 
 
-2.30      (1) 
-1.85      (0) 
 
-0.12      (1) 
-2.39      (0) 
 
-1.98      (1) 
-1.96      (0) 
 
 1.19      (4) 
-6.18**    (3) 
 
-2.15      (1) 
-3.90**    (0) 
 
-2.16      (1) 
-3.89**    (0) 
 
-1.78      (4) 
-2.97      (3) 
 
-2.32      (0) 
-5.10**    (1) 
 
-1.84      (1) 
-9.40**    (0) 
 
-2.60      (2) 
-1.99      (1) 
 
-2.00      (1) 
-10.95**  (0) 
 
-2.49      (0) 
-5.65**    (0) 
-1.79      (0) 
-4.75**    (0) 
 
-2.30      (1) 
-1.85      (0) 
 
-0.12      (1) 
-2.39      (0) 
 
-1.98      (1) 
-1.96      (0) 
  
 1.19      (4) 
-6.18**    (3) 
 
-2.15      (1) 
-3.90**    (0) 
 
-2.16      (1) 
-3.89**    (0) 
 
-1.78      (4) 
-2.97      (3) 
 
-2.88      (1) 
-5.10**    (1) 
 
-2.52      (3) 
-9.40**    (0) 
 
-2.60      (2) 
-2.70      (3) 
 
-2.00      (1) 
-5.69**    (1) 
 
-2.49      (0) 







I(2) or higher 
 
 





























-  τδ is the general specification of the test that includes both time trend and intercept. τγ is a restricted 
specification of the test that includes intercept and no time trend. 
-  Numbers in parenthesis are the numbers of lags used in the ADF tests 
-  Critical values for τγ are: -3.00 (at 5% significance level) and -2.63 (at 10% significance level). Critical 
values for τδ are: -3.60 (at 5% significance level) and -3.24 (at 10% significance level). [Source: Harris 
and Sollis (2003), p. 43] 
-  (**) denotes significant at 5%, while (*) denotes significant at 10%. 
-  L denotes natural log of the adjacent variable, while DL denotes the first difference of the adjacent 
variable. 
- In equation 3 the variables are in per capita form. The tests are performed on individual time series before 
they were transformed into per capita forms. A combined variable (e.g. LXPpc) of two I(1) series (e.g. LXP 
and LPop)  will also be I(1).   22
Similarly, the model reported in eq. 3 above used privatisation flow (priv) rather than 
privatisation stock (privs) as the former is I(1) in levels, while the latter is not as indicated 
by  the  results  of  the  unit  root  tests  reported  in  table  1.  Hence,  all  variables  used  in 
equation (3) are I(1) in levels, which ensures non-spurious regression results. 
 
5.2 Cointegration and Long-run relationship: 
 
Table 2 reports the results of Johansen’s test with restricted intercepts and no trends for 
Argentina’s model.    
 
Table 2: Johansen’s cointegration test (ARGENTINA), 1971 – 2000 
For series gdppc, kpc, privpc, hk, and fdipc 
Part A: LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null  Alternative  Statistic  95% C.V.  Eigenvalues 
r = 0 
r ≤ 1 
r ≤ 2 
r ≤ 3 
r ≤ 4 
r = 1 
r = 2 
r = 3 
r = 4 
















Part B: LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null  Alternative  Statistic  95% C.V.  Eigenvalues 
r = 0 
r ≤ 1 
r ≤ 2 
r ≤ 3 
r ≤ 4 
r ≥ 1 
r ≥ 2 
r ≥ 3 
r ≥ 4 

















(**) indicates statistical significance at 5%. 
Test performed using Microfit v 4.1. 
r is the number of cointegrated relationships among the tested variables. 
 
The  cointegration  tests  indicate  that  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  cointegration  can  be 
rejected at the 5% significance level. There exist only one cointegrating vector and there 
is a long run relationship among growth in GDP per capita (gdppc), domestic capital 
stock per capita (kpc), privatisation proceeds per capita (privpc), human capital (hk), and,   23
FDI  stock  per  capita  (fdipc).  Table  3  presents  the  normalised  coefficients  of  the 
cointegrating vector for Argentina and their statistical significance: 
 
Table 3: Normalised cointegrating vectors: coefficients normalised on gdppc 
Specific
ation 























































- (*) denotes statistical significance at 10%  
- (**) denotes statistical significance at 5% 
- Χ2 statistic is reported in between the brackets. 
 
The above estimations for the normalised coefficients are obtained using Microfit v. 4.1. 
The program offers an option for testing restrictions using LR test
20. Hence, individual 
restrictions of the form a=0 are tested for each estimated coefficient
21, and the resulted Χ
2 
statistic is reported in between the brackets.  
 
The estimated cointegrated vector indicates that only capital stock and privatisation have 
significant effects in the long run. It seems that most of the effects in the long run results 
from the accumulation of domestic capital as the coefficient is relatively large (i.e. 0.86) 
and statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
 
FDI coefficient, on the other hand, is statistically insignificant, while the coefficient of 
privatisation  is  statistically  significant  yet  exhibits  a  negative  sign,  which  implies  a 
negative effect on GDP in the long run. In Argentina, 50% of the privatisation proceeds   24
are generated from the privatisation of the energy sector, which includes the national 
petroleum company YPF. FDI participation constituted large part of the privatisation in 
Argentina  (e.g.  in  the  privatisation  of  YPF,  FDI  constituted  87%  of  the  generated 
proceeds). Alfaro (2003) found that FDI in primary sector
22 tend to have negative effects 
on the economy. Hence, privpc may be picking up the effects of FDI
23, which may reflect 
the existence of multiocollinearity problem between privatisation and FDI variables. The 
following sub-section addresses this issue.  
 
5.3 Multicollinearity tests: 
 
Given  that  FDI  participation  in  Argentina  accounts  for  63%  of  total  privatisation 
proceeds, there is high possibility that multicollinearity exists. Gujarati (1988, p. 299) 
suggests a simple detection method for multicollinearity. By examining the correlation 
matrix of the estimated variables, “if the correlation coefficient between two regressors is 
high, … in excess of 0.8, then multicollinearity is a serious problem”.  Table 4 reports the 
estimated correlation matrix for the above variables. 
 
Table 4: Estimated Correlation Matrix of the long-run relationship variables 
  gdppc  Kpc  Fdipc  Privpc  hk 
Gdppc  1.0000             
Kpc  .14553      1.0000           
Fdipc  .13742      .98729      1.0000         
Privpc  .12613      .55250      .56139      1.0000       
hk   .084016      .95663      .94191      .52236      1.0000                 
 
The correlation coefficient between fdipc and privpc is 0.56, which is not too high as 
suggested by Gujarati (1998) and hence, multicollinearity may not be a serious problem.   25
However, Gujarati (1988) points out that correlations are a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity may still exist even if correlations are 
low. 
 
Maddala and Lahiri (2009) points out that when more than two explanatory variables are 
involved, a more appropriate multicollinearity test is to see if Ry
2 < Ri
2, a rule known by 
Klein’s rule, where Ry
2 is the squared multiple correlation from the regression of the 
dependent variable y on the explanatory variables xis, while Ri
2 is the squared multiple 
correlation from the regression of variable xi on the other explanatory variables. When 
this rule was applied, Ry
2of the above long-run relationship when estimated using OLS
24 
was found to be 0.06, while R
2
privpc was found to be 0.32, which may indicate a serious 
problem of multicollinearity.  
 
Maddala  and  Lahiri  (2009)  argue,  however,  that  this  method  is  also  useful  as  an 
indication rather than confirmation of possible serious multicollinearity problem. Rather, 
one should examine the standard errors and the t-ratio or the stability of the estimated 
coefficients  when  one  of  the  variables  is  dropped  to  make  a  conclusion  regarding 
multicollinearity. Examination of standard errors and t-ratios in Tables A4 (i), (ii), and 
(iii) does not indicate a serious multicollinearity problem between FDI and privatisation 
variables.  Furthermore,  when  the  long-run  cointegrated  relationship  was  re-estimated 
once after dropping privpc and then fdipc, as shown in specifications (2) and (3) in table 3 
above,  the  estimated  coefficients  were  relatively  stable,  which  may  indicate  that 
multicollinearity between these two variables may not represent a serious problem.    26
In light of the above discussion, it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion regarding 
multicollinearity  between  privpc  and  fdipc.  Still,  as  a  final  test,  the  cointegrated 
relationship was re-estimated using a privatisation dummy (Privdum) rather than privpc, 
after the unit root tests found that Privdum is I(1) in levels (see table 1, above), and the 
cointegration test found that there exist only one cointegrating relationship between the 
variables in the long-run, as indicated by Table 5 below: 
 
Table 5: Johansen’s cointegration test (ARGENTINA), 1971 – 2000 
For series gdppc, kpc, privdum, hk, and fdipc 
Part A: LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null  Alternative  Statistic  95% C.V.  Eigenvalues 
r = 0 
r ≤ 1 
r ≤ 2 
r ≤ 3 
r ≤ 4 
r = 1 
r = 2 
r = 3 
r = 4 
















Part B: LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null  Alternative  Statistic  95% C.V.  Eigenvalues 
r = 0 
r ≤ 1 
r ≤ 2 
r ≤ 3 
r ≤ 4 
r ≥ 1 
r ≥ 2 
r ≥ 3 
r ≥ 4 

















(**) indicates statistical significance at 5%. 
Test performed using Microfit v 4.1. 
r is the number of cointegrated relationships among the tested variables. 
 
The results of the re-estimated cointegrated vector (Table 6) are similar to that of the 
results of table 3; long-run economic growth in Argentina is still positively affected by 
the accumulation of domestic capital (kpc) and negatively affected by privatisation. The 
evidence indicates that FDI still have insignificant effects on economic growth. One may 
argue, hence, any possible multicollinearity between FDI and privatisation may not be 
posing a serious problem on estimation and that the negative effects of privatisation on 
long-run economic growth may be due to other factors.   27
Table 6: Normalised cointegrating vectors: coefficients normalised on gdppc 
Specification using Privdum 
Specific
ation 
















- (*) denotes statistical significance at 10%  
- (**) denotes statistical significance at 5% 
- (***) denotes statistical significance at 1% 
- Χ2 statistic is reported in between the brackets. 
 
Saba and Manzetti (1997) argue that, for the Argentine privatisation programme to be 
implemented quickly, the majority of the power and decision of privatisation had to be 
concentrated within the Executive Branch. This had indeed accelerated the application of 
privatisation and removed many obstacles; however, they argue that it also increased 
corruption. They also claim that favouritism took place in some privatisations (e.g. the 
privatisation  of  the  Airline  company,  and  the  telecommunication  company),  which 
resulted in limited proceeds than what could have been actually achieved
25. Furthermore, 
the speedy application of the privatisation programme meant that in some cases, there 
were  no  prior  regulatory  frameworks  established,  such  as  in  the  case  of 
telecommunication (Alexander and Corti, 1993; World Bank, 1993). Rather, regulatory 
reforms were carried out after the start of privatisation in the 1990s, and yet, the newly 
established regulatory agencies were considered by some (e.g. Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999) 
as lacking enforceability and objectivity due to their susceptibility to political influences 
or  private  firms’  agenda.  Empirical  studies  (e.g.  Staehr,  2005)  found  that  large-scale 
privatisations  that  are  carried  out  without  the  adjoining  application  of  structural  and 
regulatory reforms lead to negative effects on economic growth.  
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5.4 Error Correction Model: 
 
The residual of the long run relationship (i.e. error correction term; EC) is an I(0) variable 
and  it  is  used  to  construct  an  error  correction  model.  The  advantage  of  using  error 
correction models is that they capture the short and long run effects of the determinants of 
economic  growth  (Hendry,  2000;  Maddala,  2001).  The  error  correction  model  for 
equation 3 now becomes: 
 
￿gdppct = α + β ￿kpct-i + γ ￿fdipct-i + δ ￿hkt-i + η ￿xppct-i + λ ￿privpct-i + µ ￿xdebtratt-i 
+ φ ECt-1 + εt                                                                                                                     (6)  
 
where i = the number of lags. ECt-1 is the lagged residual of the cointegrated relationship. 
It  is  calculated  using  the  normalised  long-run  coefficients  reported  in  table  3 
(specification 1).  
 
Given  that  the  various  multicollinearity  tests  performed  above  did  not  provide  a 
conclusive evidence of a serious multicollinearity problem, the error correction model 
will be estimated using the residual of the long-run relationship that was estimated using 
privpc. Furthermore, because the error correction model uses variables measured in first 
difference,  such  transformation  of  variables  reduces  the  possibility  of  serious 
multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 1988).  
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Parameters α, β, γ, δ, η, λ, and µ represent short-run elasticities for growth in GDP per 
capita with respect to changes in the explanatory variables.  The coefficient of the error 
correction term (φ) is an adjustment parameter that reflects the speed of correcting the 
deviation  of  the  current  economic  growth  from  its  long  run  relationship  with  the 
explanatory variables.  
 
Equation (6) is run with a maximum of 2 lags for each variable due to the shortness of the 
time period covered. The general model is estimated, and then F-tests are applied on 
blocks  of  insignificant  coefficients  to  test  whether  these  coefficients  are  jointly 
insignificant and, hence, their variables can be dropped from the model. This approach is 
called the  ‘general  to  specific’ approach.  It  is  recommended  that  when applying  this 
approach to examine both the individual and joint significance tests and not use large 
blocks of variables so that a variable that may be relevant to the model is not dropped 
inadvertently. The ‘General-to-Specific’ approach has been proven successful in deriving 
a unique representative model.
26  
 
Table 7 presents the results of the best error correction model that are estimated over the 
period of 1971 – 2000 for Argentina using the ‘General-to-Specific’ approach. F-tests do 
not allow for deleting any further variable from the above model. Deleting any further 
variable  from  the  model  will  result  in  misspecification,  and  hence,  the  estimated 
coefficients will be biased.  
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Table 7: Error correction Models, dependent variable ∆gdppc, 1971 – 2000 
 



















































































-  a: Diagnostic problems refer to the 4 diagnostic tests performed by Microfit for 
Serial  Correlation  (SC),  Functional  Form  (FF),  Normality  (NM),  and 
Heteroscedasticity (HSC). 
-  T-ratios in brackets.  
(***) indicates significance at 1%, (**) indicates significance at 5%, while (*) indicates 
significance at 10%.   31
The results indicate that economic growth, in a given year, seems to respond elastically to 
current changes in domestic capital stock. A 1% increase in the growth of capital stock 
per capita will lead to 7% increase in economic growth in the same year, ceteris paribus. 
The positive effect of growth in domestic capital is consistent with the evidence reported 
by  previous  empirical  studies  (e.g.  Nunnenkamp  and  Spatz,  2003;  Zhang,  2001; 
Vamvakidis, 2002)
27. The high elasticity of growth in output with respect of growth in 
domestic capital is interpreted as an indication of the existence of endogenous growth. It 
is also noted that, in models that follow growth accounting methodology, high capital 
elasticity estimates reflect the effects of FDI externalities (De Mello, 1997, p. 12). 
 
The lagged effect of growth in capital stock per capita, surprisingly, seems to have a 
negative significant effect on economic growth in Argentina (i.e. -2.7575). In a study on 
economic  growth  in  Mexico,  Ramirez  (2006)  reports  positive  large  effects  of  lagged 
growth in domestic capital on Mexico’s economic growth. However, he also points out 
that,  even  though  growth  in  domestic  capital  is  lagged,  there  could  be  possible 
simultaneity bias (Ramirez, 2006, p.814). In this case, the negative effect of domestic 
capital can be due to the effect of externalities induced by other determinants such as 
FDI. FDI can be complementing domestic investment by transferring new technology to, 
and  creating  linkages  with,  the  domestic  investment.  However,  the  degree  of 
complementarity  can  phase  out  depending  on  how  fast  technology  is  transferred  to 
domestic firms (De Mello, 1997). Possible simultaneity bias and the speed of the transfer 
of  positive  externalities  can  explain  why  when  FDI  has  positive  lagged  effect  on 
economic growth; domestic capital would have negative lagged effect (See table 4). One   32
may argue that the net effect of growth in capital stock on economic growth will be 
positive, as the size of the short-run coefficient of ￿kpct is larger than that of the lagged 
variable. Hence, in the long-run growth in capital will have positive significant effects on 
economic growth in Argentina.  
 
The model also indicates that a 10% increase in the growth of FDI stock per capita, in a 
given year, leads to 0.9% decrease in the same year’s economic growth in Argentina. FDI 
can have negative effects on economic growth if the remittances of FDI profits exceeds 
the  value  of  new  FDI  inflows  and  hence  create    negative  effects  on  the  balance  of 
payments and/or if FDI is crowding out domestic investment (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 
2003). Moreover, the effects of FDI on economic growth will depend on the sector in 
which  it  takes  place.  FDI  in  the  primary  sector  tends  to  have  negative  effects  on 
economic growth, while FDI in the manufacturing sector tends to have positive effects 
(Alfaro, 2003). Hence, the immediate negative effects of FDI on the economic growth of 
Argentina can be attributed to the fact that the majority of FDI inflows to Argentina were 
directed to the Petroleum sector
28, and accounted for 87% of the privatisation proceeds of 
the petroleum company YPF
29.  
 
On the other hand, the results also indicate that lagged growth in FDI has positive effects 
on economic growth. A 10% increase in the growth of FDI stock per capita, in a given 
year,  will  lead  to  1%  increase  in  economic  growth  after  two  years.  The  estimated 
coefficients for the current FDI and the lagged FDI variables, however, are of the same 
size but opposite signs (i.e. -0.09 and 0.10; respectively). This may imply that the overall   33
effect of FDI on Argentina’s economic growth in the short run is null. A Wald test
30 is 
performed to test the restriction (i.e. null hypothesis) that γ0+γ2 = 0.
31 The result of the 
Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis. Hence, one may conclude that the overall 
effect of FDI on short-run economic growth in Argentina is zero.  
  
Economic growth is also affected by the degree of openness of the economy (Edwards, 
1990). Growth in exports is one of the proxies used by empirical studies (e.g. Ramirez, 
2006; Nair-Reichert and  Weinhold, 2001) to measure openness. Growth in exports is 
expected to affect economic growth directly via exerting positive effects on the trade 
balance. It is also expected that growth in exports will have indirect effects on economic 
growth by attracting export-led domestic and foreign investment (Ramirez, 2006, p. 807).  
 
According to the results, a 10% increase in the growth of exports per capita (￿xppct) in a 
given year will lead to a 1.9% increase in economic growth of the following year. A 
positive significant coefficient of exports growth is regarded as an indication that the 
country is applying export-promotion policies (Ramirez, 2006).  
 
The regression results indicate that privatisation has no significant effect on short-run 
economic growth (Table 7), while, in the long run, it has significant negative effect on 
GDP per capita (Table 3).  As indicated earlier, the negative sign of the long-run privpc 
coefficient may be capturing the effects of other factors, such as the weakness of the 
regulatory reforms (e.g. Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1999). 
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The results of the error correction models also indicate that growth in human capital has 
significant positive effects on short-run economic growth in Argentina. a 10% increase in 
the two-years lagged growth rate of human capital will lead to 3.8% increase in economic 
growth; ceteris paribus. In the long run, however, human capital has insignificant effect 
on  Argentina’s  GDP  per  capita.    Empirical  studies  have  reported  similar  conflicting 
effects  of  human  capital  on  economic  growth  in  developing  countries.  While  some 
empirical studies (e.g. Edwards, 1998; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Li and Liu 2005) reported 
positive  significant  effects  of  human  capital  on  economic  growth,  others  (e.g. 
Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003; Zhang, 2001; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Islam, 1995) 
reported  insignificant  (positive  and  sometimes  negative)  effects  of  human  capital  on 
economic growth. Such conflict in reported results can be attributed to the quality of 
proxies used in reflecting the quality of human capital stock in a given country. 
 
The estimated results of the error correction model also indicate that current and lagged 
growth  in  external  debt  ratio  has  negative  significant  effects  on  short-run  economic 
growth in Argentina. A 10% increase in the growth of current external debt ratio will lead 
to a decrease in economic growth by 0.6%; ceteris paribus. While a 10% increase in the 
lagged growth of external debt will decrease economic growth by 0.7%; ceteris paribus. 
Theoretically,  external  debt  may  have  positive  effects  on  economic  growth  within 
neoclassical models, if reasonable levels of debt are used to finance investment (Pattillo 
et al., 2002). However, external debt can also have negative effects if the rate of debt 
accumulation is higher than the rate of investment (Lin and Sosin, 2001). Argentina had 
high external debt ratios (e.g. 85% in 1989) and the rate of debt accumulation was faster   35
than the rate of new investment. It was such high levels of foreign debt that required 
some intervention in the form of economic reform policies to reduce the debt levels. 
Hence, the estimated negative effect is what to be expected for the case of Argentina. 
 
The coefficient of the lagged error correction term (ECt-1) is negative and statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient indicates the speed of adjustment required to return 
to the long-run relationship. In Argentina, the deviation between current growth and the 
long-run relationship will be corrected by 34.8% in the following year.  
 
To sum up, the results of the estimated error correction model in table 7 estimates the 
determinants  of  economic  growth  in  Argentina  during  1971-2000.  The  adjusted  R
2 
indicate  that  the  estimated  error  correction  model  explains  88%  of  the  changes  in 
economic  growth.  Diagnostic  tests  indicate  no  problems  of  serial  correlation,  wrong 
functional form, non-normality or heteroscedasticity. These results, however, should be 
interpreted cautiously as data availability limits us to 30 observations. Longer time series 




The aim of this paper is to measure the effects of FDI and privatisation on economic 
growth  in  Argentina.  The  privatisation  era  in  most  of  the  developing  countries  was 
mainly from late 1980s to 2000. Hence, a time series error correction model for economic 
growth over the period 1971-2000 is constructed using the general-to-specific approach.   36
The advantage of error correction models is that they combine both the short-run and 
long-run effects on economic growth.  
 
The World Bank (1993 and various issues) often described the Argentinean experience 
with privatisation as a ‘successful’ experience. Although it is not actually clear how the 
World  Bank  measures  success,  one  may  assume  that  the  success  of  the  Argentinean 
privatisation programme is measured in terms of the amount of privatisation proceeds 
generated  (i.e.  $  44.581  billion  by  2000)  and  the  speed  it  was  applied  and  the 
government’s commitment to finish the programme within the specified time agreed with 
the World Bank. The Argentinean government did indeed privatise almost all of its SOEs 
and  welcomed  the  participation  of  FDI  inflows.  One,  therefore,  would  expect  that 
privatisation  and  FDI  would  then  have  positive  effects  on  the  economic  growth  of 
Argentina.  The  results  of  the  estimated  models  in  this  paper,  however,  report  the 
opposite. 
 
The results indicate that while growth in current FDI stock per capita is found to have 
negative effects growth in the lagged FDI stock per capita (i.e. 2-year lag) is found to 
have a positive effect. However, the estimated short-run coefficients for FDIpc stock are 
equal in value but have opposite signs, suggesting an overall effect of zero. A Wald test 
could not reject the hypothesis that the overall effect of FDI in the short run is zero. 
Moreover, in the long run, the results of the cointegration vector indicate that FDI has 
insignificant  effects  on  economic  growth.  Hence,  over  1971  –  2000,  the  reported 
evidence suggests that FDI had no significant effects on economic growth in Argentina.   37
 
Privatisation, on the other hand, is found to have negative effects on long-run economic 
growth only. The negative effects of privatisation can be explained by the state of the 
adjoining reforms. Staehr (2005) found that large-scale privatisation that are carried out 
without  adjoining  reforms  will  lead  to  negative  effects  on  economic  growth.  In 
Argentina, there were no regulatory agencies prior to privatisation. The government of 
Argentine started in establishing the regulatory agencies in 1990; after it had already 
privatised two major SOEs (i.e. the national telecommunication company; ENTel, and the 
national airline company; AA). Although the establishment of these agencies was relatively 
quick, Pastor Jr. and Wise (1999) argue that the established agencies lacked real power and was 
influenced by political factors and private investors’ agendas.  
 
The  sectoral  distribution  of  privatisation  may  also  explain  the  negative  effects  of 
privatisation in Argentina. In Argentina, the majority of privatisation were in the energy 
and infrastructure sectors (i.e. 50% and 39%; respectively). It is argued that economic 
growth is led by investing in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, one may argue that 
the negative effect of privatisation is reflecting the negative effects of FDI on economic 
growth given that 63% of privatisation proceeds are in the form of FDI, and that most of 
these FDI participations were in the Petroleum sector which is characterised with high 
profit remittances.  
 
One  should  be  cautious  in  interpreting  the  results  of  the  time-series  error  correction 
models, however, because of the shortness of the time period covered and the possibility 
of  multicollinearity  between  privatisation  and  FDI  variables  (even  though  the   38
multicollinearity  tests  were  inconclusive).  Structural  break  tests  may  also  be  needed 
given the surge of the FDI inflows post 1990.  
 
Furthermore, the results of the time-series models apply to Argentina only. These results 
might not be robust for other developing countries. Time series models do not allow for 
the  effects  of  cross-country  differences.  Country-specific  characteristics  may  better 
explain the differences in economic growth determinants. Therefore, panel data models 
can be used to overcome the shortness of the time period covered, to account for the 
cross-country effects and to obtain more generalised conclusions for the determinants of 
economic growth in the developing countries. In addition, panel data models offer more 
variability that lead to less collinearity among variables and provide more reliable and 
efficient estimates (Harris and Sollis, 2003, p. 189). Hence, further research is needed to 
address the above issues. 
 
NOTES: 
                                                 
1 See table A2 in the appendix for major privatisation between 1989- 2000. 
2 The World Bank (1993), p. 6-7, and Harteneck and McMahon (1996), p. 75. 
3  Argentinean  privatisation  was  more  open  to  FDI  than  the  Egyptian  programme,  where  FDI  participation  in  the 
Egyptian privatisation programme amounted to $1 billion (i.e. 22% of total privatisation proceeds). 
4 See table A1 in the Appendix. 
5 Borensztein  et al. (1996), De Mello (1999), and Balasubramanyam et al. (1999). 
6 Sader (1993 and 1995) found that privatisation in developing countries attract more FDI inflows to these 
countries. 
7 Kebede (2002) argued that the availability of minimum level of human capital is also a pre-requisite for trade to affect 
economic growth positively.  
8 Enos and Yun (2002) identified FDI as the major vehicle of technology transfer. They can transfer product-related 
and/or organisational techniques. 
9 Bennett et al. (2004), p. 37 
10 A similar argument is presented in Grossman and Helpman (1994), p. 26.  
11 Using the same method followed by Borensztein et al. (1998) and Li and Liu (2005), Secondary School 
average attainment of population above 25 years old is calculated as follows: Assuming that 10% of the 
population above 25 years old attended secondary school, out of which 75% completed the 6 years of 
secondary school while the remaining (i.e. 25%) has gone through the first 3 years only. In this case, 
secondary school attainment is 0.10 x (6 x 0.75 + 3 x 0.25) + 0.9 x 0 = 0.53. Barro and Lee’s (2000)   39
                                                                                                                                                  
international  data  on  education  attainment  [www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html]  indicate  that  in 
1975, 14.8% of population above 25 years old in Argentina attended secondary school, out of which 6.3% 
completed secondary school. 
12 The term “augmented neo-classical function” was used by Mankiw et. al (1992) when they added human capital 
variable to the neo-classical production function. 
13 Given a production function of 
β β − =
1 H Ak y d  where the function is in per capita terms, kd is domestic 
capital, and β is the share of domestic physical capital. H is overall stock of knowledge in the host country 
and is represented by: 
η α ] [ w dk k H = where kw is foreign-owned capital, and α and η are marginal and 
intertemporal  elasticities  of  substitution  between  foreign  and  domestic  capital;  respectively.    The 
intertemporal  Optimisation  Framework  combines  the  supply  and  demand  sides  of  the  economy,  by 
maximising private consumption as follows:  
                            













c w k Ak d k
dt t e c u
d
t
β αη β η β
ρ
 
where ρ is the rate of time preference of the utility maximiser, and c is private consumption. (See De Mello, 
1997, pp. 12-13 for more details). 
14 See the appendix for the definition of variables and the expected sign of their coefficients. 
15 More details on data construction and variables definition are reported in the Appendix. 
16 In order to obtain meaningful causal relationships, time-series models assume that the variables included 
are stationary (i.e. their means, variance and covariance are constant and are independent of time). [Harris 
and Sollis, 2003, pp. 26-27] 
17 Having both the constant and time trend (i.e. deterministic trends) in the unit root test “increases … the 
critical values, making it harder to reject the null hypothesis, even when it should be rejected”. (Harris and 
Sollis, 2003, p. 46) 
18 Harris and Sollis (2003), p. 47. 
19 For more details, see Harris and Sollis (2003), pp. 41 – 57. 
20 As Maddala (2001), p. 203 pointed out that LR test requires large number of observations. Given our 
small sample, the test results should be viewed with care. 
21 a=0 is the null hypothesis of the test (i.e. the estimated coefficient, a, is equal to zero or is statistically 
insignificant). 
22 Some activities in the petroleum sector, such as extraction and drilling, are classified as primary sector. 
23 When privpc is removed from the long run relationship, the sign of the estimated long-run coefficient of fdipc 
changed to negative, which supports the above argument. 
24 See tables A6 and A7 in the appendix. 
25 When ENTEL was offered for privatisation, three successful bids were received. The first highest bid was from a 
Spanish company, the second highest bid was from an American company, while the third highest bid was from a 
French company. ENTEL was divided into two sub companies and was privatised to the Spanish and the French 
companies. Favouritism led to accepting the third highest bid over the second highest bid. The privatisation of AA was 
also problematic as there were claims that some officials asked for bribes (Saba and Manzetti, 1997, p. 364). The whole 
process of privatising AA was problematic that the government had to buy some of the privatised shares back.  
26 See Hendry (2000) for more details on the ‘General-to-Specific’ approach. 
27 These empirical studies use the share of investment in GDP as a proxy for domestic capital stock; a 
common accepted practice used in the literature due to the lack of data on capital stock. 
28 International organisations, such as the World Bank, include Petroleum as part of the primary sector. 
29 The privatisation of YPF represents the largest privatisation transaction in the Argentine privatisation programme. 
30 Wald test statistic (W) is given by: W= (RRSS-URSS)/ (URSS/n). [Maddala, 2001, p. 176] 
31 γ0 is the coefficient of ∆fdipct, while γ2 is the coefficient of ∆fdipct-2.    40
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Appendix 




















1960  NA  NA  7.60  7.60  NA  NA  NA 
1961  5.43  3.52  5.99  5.99  13.39  NA  NA 
1962  -0.85  -2.46  4.69  9.38  28.32  NA  87.17E-13 
1963  -5.31  -6.72  7.89  7.89  23.90  NA  13.87E-12 
1964  10.13  8.57  5.56  5.56  22.20  NA  14.04E-12 
1965  10.57  9.05  6.23  4.15  28.63  NA  16.96E-12 
1966  -0.66  -2.02  6.65  4.99  31.91  NA  20.92E-12 
1967  3.19  1.76  7.50  5.00  29.20  NA  33.34E-12 
1968  4.82  3.32  6.48  5.40  16.21  NA  35.00E-12 
1969  9.68  8.06  6.40  6.40  7.57  NA  35.00E-12 
1970  3.05  1.46  5.60  4.74  13.59  18.39  37.92E-12 
1971  5.66  3.89  6.01  6.61  34.73  18.78  45.22E-12 
1972  1.63  -0.08  7.20  6.84  58.45  19.50  50.00E-12 
1973  2.81  1.09  7.61  5.71  61.25  13.75  50.00E-12 
1974  5.53  3.80  6.90  6.29  23.47  10.53  50.00E-12 
1975  -0.03  -1.64  5.82  5.98  182.93  14.73  36.58E-11 
1976  -2.02  -3.55  9.18  5.92  443.97  18.13  14.00E-10 
1977  6.93  5.32  9.62  7.33  176.00  20.16  40.76E-10 
1978  -4.51  -5.91  8.61  5.72  175.51  22.86  79.58E-10 
1979  10.22  8.60  6.51  6.33  159.51  30.25  13.17E-09 
1980  4.15  2.60  5.06  6.48  100.76  35.29  18.37E-09 
1981  -5.69  -7.11  6.92  7.37  104.48  45.32  44.03E-09 
1982  -4.96  -6.39  9.09  6.52  164.78  51.76  25.92E-08 
1983  3.88  2.31  9.15  5.84  343.81  44.16  10.53E-07 
1984  2.21  0.67  7.59  4.76  626.72  61.77  67.65E-07 
1985  -7.59  -8.97  11.74  6.27  672.18  57.62  60.18E-06 
1986  7.88  6.28  8.16  6.32  90.10  47.28  94.30E-06 
1987  2.91  1.41  7.87  7.58  131.33  52.61  21.44E-05 
1988  -2.56  -3.94  9.53  6.21  342.96  46.62  87.53E-05 
1989  -7.50  -8.76  13.06  6.58  3079.81  85.15  0.04 
1990  -2.40  -3.68  10.36  4.63  2313.96  44.03  0.49 
1991  12.67  11.19  7.68  6.08  171.67  34.47  0.95 
1992  11.94  10.46  6.60  8.31  24.90  29.87  0.99 
1993  5.91  4.51  6.96  9.32  10.61  27.34  1.00 
1994  5.84  4.43  7.56  10.60  4.18  29.19  1.00 
1995  -2.85  -4.14  9.70  10.07  3.38  38.29  1.00 
1996  5.53  4.17  10.46  11.05  0.16  40.94  1.00 
1997  8.11  6.74  10.56  12.72  0.53  43.85  1.00 
1998  3.85  2.55  10.41  12.90  0.92  47.35  1.00 
1999  -3.40  -4.60  9.80  11.49  -1.17  51.29  1.00 
2000  -0.52  -1.74  10.78  11.42  -0.94  51.30  1.00 
Source: WDI CD-ROM (2002) 
a calculations are based on constant 1995 US$. 
b LCU per US$       45
Table A2: Selected Major Privatisations in Argentina since 1989 
Company/ 
Sector 
Structure/units  Year   Percentage and Method   Proceeds ($ bil.)  FX in 
$ Bil. 
Buyers 
Cash  Debt 
ENTel  Telecom  Argentina,  S.A. 
(Northern Area) 
1990  60% - competitive bidding  0.1  2.3  1.80  STET/ France Consortium  
1992  30% - IPO  1.2  -  - 
Telefónica  Argentina, 
S.A. (Southern Area) 
1990  60% - competitive bidding  0.114  2.7  2.03  Telefónica Español Consortium 
1991  30% - IPO  0.830  -  0.364 
AA    1989-1992  57% - Competitive bidding  0.260  1.61  1.30  Iberia Airline Consortium  
Petroleum  YPF’s  drilling  areas  and 
distillation facilities 





SEGBA  for  Greater 
Buenos Aires and Agua y 
Energía.  Restructured 
into  new  business  units 
covering,  power  plants, 
distribution  and 
transmission. 
1992 – 1998  Various  3.295  1.932  3.649  Various  foreign  and  local 
buyers 
Natural Gas  Restructured  into  2 
regional  gas 
transportation  and  8 




Various  1.031  1.541  1.430  Various  foreign  and  local 
buyers 
Waterworks  Obras  Sanitarias  de  la 
Nación 
1992  30 year concession  -  -  -  Foreign and local investors 
Obras  Sanitarias 
Mendoza 
1998  95-year concession (70%) 
 
0.133  -  0.133  French/American/Italian 
Consortium 
Aguas  del  Gran  Buenos 
Aires, S.A. 
2000  Concession (BOT)  0.120  -  n.a.  n.a. 
Banks/Finance  6  banks/  financial 
entities  were  privatised 
between 1992 – 1999. 
1992-1999  Various  0.951  -  0.58  Foreign and local investors. 
Source: World Bank privatisation database for data until 1999 and IFC privatisation database for 2000 data. World Bank (1993), Gerchunoff and Coloma 
(1993), and Herteneck and McMahon (1996) for information about the restructured units (i.e. column 2).     
   46
A4- Variable definitions: 
 
-  ∆gdppct = growth in GDP per capita 
 
-  ∆kpct = growth in domestic capital stock per capita. The sign of its coefficient is 
expected to be positive as an increase in the stock of physical capital leads to an 
increase in economic growth. 
 
 
-  ∆fdipct = growth rate in FDI stock per capita. FDI may have positive or negative 
effects  on  economic  growth  depending  on  the  nature  of  its  spillovers.  If  FDI 
complement  domestic  investment,  participate  in  augmenting  human  capital,  and 
facilitates the transfer of appropriate technology, then it is expected to have positive 
effects.  However,  if  FDI  leads  to  substantial  transfers  of  profits  from  the  host 
country,  transfer  of  inappropriate  capital,  or  crowding  out  domestic  investment, 
then it can have negative effects on economic growth (Ramirez, 2006). In addition, 
the effects of FDI on economic growth depend on the sector in which it takes place. 
FDI  in  manufacturing  tend  to  have  positive  effects  on  growth  while  FDI  in  the 
primary sector tends to have negative effects (Alfaro, 2003) Hence, the sign of the 
coefficient may be either positive or negative.  
 
-  ∆hkt  =  growth  rate  in  human  capital.  Secondary  school  enrolment  as  a 
percentage of population of official secondary school age (i.e. gross enrolment ratio) 
is used to proxy for human capital. The coefficient is expected to be positive.  
 
 
-  ∆xppct = growth in exports as a measure of the export-orientation of the country. 
Countries  that  follow  export-promotion  policies  are  expected  to  grow  faster  than 
countries  that  follow  import-substitution  policies  (Edwards,  1990).  Hence,  the 
expected sign of the coefficient is positive.  
 
-  ∆privpct = growth in privatisation proceeds per capita as a measure of the size of 
the privatisation  program applied in the country. Large privatisation  programmes 
reflects the shrinkage of the size of the public sector, and therefore, its coefficient is 
expected to be positive. 
 
 
-  ∆xdebtratt  =  growth  in  external  foreign  debt  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  In 
neoclassical models, external debt is expected to have positive effect on economic 
growth if it is in reasonable levels and if it is used to finance investment (Pattillo et 
al.,  2002).  On  the  other  hand,  external  debt  may  also  have  negative  effects  on 
economic growth if it is accumulated by a higher rate than the rate of investment 
(Lin  and  Sosin,  2001;  Pattillo  et  al.,  2002).  Hence,  the  sign  of  the  external  debt 
coefficient can be either positive or negative. 
 
 